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part when co1npletely manufactured, hut the ra'v
materials for it as 'veil."
No authority 'vas, or could be, adduced for the proposition formulated in such an argument; but it ,.vas contended, nevertheless, that it logically follo·w·ed principles
recognized by international law.
c on tinuous
Before pronouncing the decision of the court I think it
Yoyage.
right to say that, if it 'vere established that ra'Y materials
'vere imported by a neutral for the manufacture of margarine 'vith an intention to supply the ene1ny 'vith the
manufactured article, I should be prepared to hold that
the doctrine of continous voyage applied so as to make
such raw materials subject to condemnation as conditional contraband 'vith an ene1ny destination.
I should go even further and hold that, if it 'vere sho,vn
that in a neutral country particular manufacturers of
1nargarine were acting in combination 'vith particular
producers or vendors of butter, and that the intention
and object of their combination 'vas to produce the
Inargarine in order to send the butter to the enemy, the
same doctrine would be applicable 'vith the same results.
But there is n long space bet,veen those t"\VO supposed
cases and the one now before the court; and this space,
in 1ny view, can not be spanned by the application of
the accepted principles of the la'v of nations.
ra;o~~~~;~~s. or I do not consider that it 'vould be in accordance 'vith
international la'v to hold that ra'v materials on their
vray to citizens of a neutral country to be converted into
a manufactured article for consumption in that country
'vere subject to condemnation on the ground that the
consequence might, or even would, necessaril.r be that
another article of a like kind, and adapted for a like
use, would be exported by other citizens of the neutral
country to the enemy.
Decision.
I therefore allow the claiin, and order that the goods
seized, or the proceeds if sold, be released to the clnin1ants.
THE "STIGSTAD."
[PRIVY CouNCIL.]
ON APPEAL FROM THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND.
December 16, 1918.
[1918] A. C. 279.

Appeal from a judgment of the president of the adiniralty division (in prize) }39
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The appellants, managers of the N or,veg.ian steamship
Stigstad, claimed in the prize court for freight, damages
for detention of the ship, and expenses. The ship had
been required to discharge her cargo at Middlesbrough,
under the provision of an order in council of March 11,
1915. The facts appear from the judgment of their
lordships.
The president, Sir Samuel Evans, upon the claim of the
Norwegian cargo owners coming before the court, had
ordered that the appellants should receive out of the
proceeds of the cargo a sum for freight to be agreed, or
in default of agreement to be determined by the registrar
in accordance with the principles laid down in the Juno. 10
The president, by a judgment delivered on April14, held
that the order in council was valid, and that the appellants
were not entitled to the further compensation which they
claimed.
The material terms of the order in council appear from statement or
.
.
the case.
the report of the proceedings before the president.
December 16. The judgment of their lordships was
delivered by Lord Sumner. The appellants in this case
were claimants below. They are a Norwegian company
\Vhich manages the steamship Stigstad for her owners,
the Klaveness . Dampskibsaktieselskab, a Norwegian
corporation. While on a voyage, begun on April 10,
1915, from Kirkenes, Sydvaranger, in Norway, to Rotterdam with iron-ore briquettes, the property of neutrals,
she "\\t'"as stopped in latitude 56 ° 9 1 N. and longitude 6 ° 6 1
E. about a day's sail from Rotterdam by H. M. S. Inconstant, and was ordered to Leith and thence to Middlesbrough to discharge. Their claim 'vas for " (1)
freight, (2) detention, and (3) expenses consequent upon"
this seizure and the discharge at Middlebrough afterwards.
The detention 'vas measured by the number of days 'vhich
elapsed between the expected date of completing discharge at Rotterdam and the actual date of completing
discharge at Middlesbrough, calculated at the chartered
rate for detention, viz, 1301. per day; and as to the
expenses, while willing to treat port dues and expenses
at Middlesbrough as the equivalent of those which 'vould
have been incurred at R,otterdam, the o'vners claimed
some port dues and expenses at Leith and a fe'v guineas for
special agency expenses at IV[iddlesbrough. Eventually
70
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the cargo was sold by consent, and a sum, the amount of
which 'vas agreed between the parties, 'vas ordered to be
paid out of the proceeds to the claimants for freight; but
the president, Sir Samuel Evans, dismissed the claims
for detention and for the special expenses. It is against
his decree that the claimants have now appealed. They
have admitted throughout that, in fact, the cargo of ironore briquettes was to be discharged into Rhine barges at
Rotterdam in order to be conveyed into Germany.
The cargo was shipped by the Aktieselskabet Sydvaranger of Kirkenes, and was to be delivered to V. V. W. Van
Drich, Stoolnboot en Transport Ondernemingen, both
neutrals, but it is contended that section 3 of the order
cn~~~~~hir1 ,c~~: in_ council, dated March 11, 1915, warranted interference
With the ship and her cargo by His Majesty's navy on the
voyage to Rotterdam. The president's directions as to
freight were that "the·fair freight must be paid to them,
having regard to the work which they did," the principle
which he had laid down in the Juno 70 being, in his opinon, applicable. The claim for detention is, in truth, a
claim for damages for interfering 'vith the completion
of the chartered voyage, for it is admitted that delivery
was taken at Middlesbrough with reasonable dispatch.
That part of the claim which relates to the ship's being
ordered to call at Leith and the claim for expenses incurred there are claims for damages for putting in force
the above-named order in council, for it is not suggested
that the order to call at Leith, and thence to proceed to
Middlesbrough, was in itself an unreasonable way of
exercising the powers given by the order. The small
claim for fees at Middlesbrough seems to relate to an
outlay incident to the earning of the freight 'vhich has
been paid, and was covered by it; but, if it is anything
else, it also is a claim for damages of the sa'me kind.
''Damages '' is the word used by the president in his
Damages,
judgment; and, although it was avoided and deprecated in
argument before their lordships, there can be no doubt
that it, and no other, is the right word to describe the
nature of the claims under appeal.
It is impossible to find in the express 'vords of the order
any language which directs that such damages should be
allowed, nor are the principles applicable 'vhich have
been followed in the .Anna Oatharina 71 al\d else-\vhere, as
10
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to allowance of freight and expenses to neutral ships~
"\vhatever be the exact scope and application of those
cases. Again, \vith the fullest recognition of the rights
of neutral ships, it is impossible to say that o'vners of
such ships can claim damages from a belligerent for putting into force such an order in council as that of March ri~~~tral t rading
11, 1915, if the order be valid. The neutral exercising
his trading rights on the high seas and the belligerent
exercising on the high seas rights given him by order in
council or equivalent procedure, are each in the enjoyment and exercise of equal rights; and, without an express
provision in the order to that effect, the belligerent does
not exercise his rights subject to any overriding right in
the neutral. The claimants' real contention is, and is
only, that the order in council is contrary to international law, and is invalid.
Upon this subject two passages in the Zamora 72 are
in point. The first is at page 95, and relates to Sir William Scott's decision in the Fox. 73 "The decision
proceeded upon the principle that, 'vhere there is just
cause for retaliation, neutrals may by the law of nations
be required to submit to inconvenience from the act of
a belligerent power greater in degree than would be
justified had no just cause for retaliation arisen, a principle which had been already laid down in the Lucy." 74 Reprisals.
Further, at page 98, are the words "An order authoriz'
ing reprisals will be conclusive as to the facts which arc
recited as showing that a case for reprisals exists, and
will have due weight as showing what, in the opinion of
His 1ffajesty's advisers, are the best or only means of
meeting the emergency; but this will not preclude the right
of any party aggrieved to contend, or the right of the court
to hold, that these means are unla,vful, as entailing on
neutrals a degree of inconvenience unreasonable, considering all the circumstances of the case."
It is true that in the Zamora 75 the validity of a retaliatory order in council was not directly in question, but
these passages \Vere carefully considered and advisedly
introduced as cogent illustrations of the principle, which
was the matter then in hand. Without ascribing to
them the binding force of a prior decision on the same
;z fl916J2 A. C. 77, 95, 98.

73

Edw. 311.
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point, their lordships must attach to them the greatest
weight and, before thinking it right to depart fro1n them,
or even necessary to criticize them at any great length,
they 'vould at least expect it to be shown either that there
arc authoritative decisions to the contrary, or that they
conflict "\\rith general principles of prize la'v or with the
rules of con1mon right in international affairs.
VVhat is here in question is not the right of the belligerent to retaliate upon his enemy the same measure as has
been meted out to him, or the propriety of justifying in
one belligerent some departure from the regular rules of
'\rar on the ground of necessity arising from prior departure
on the part of the other, but it is the claim of neutrals to
be sa vcd harinless under such circumstances from inconvenience or damage thereout arising. If the statement
above quoted from the Zarnora be correct, the recitals in
the order in council sufficiently establish the existence of
such breaches of law on the part of the German Government as justify retaliatory measures on the part of His
~lajesty, and, if so, the only question open to the neutral
claimant for the purpose of invalidating the order is
-w hether or not it subjects neutrals to more inconvenience or prejudice than is reasonably necessary under the
circumstances.
Their lordships think that such a rule is sound, and
indeed inevitable. From the nature of the case the party
who kno"\\rs best whether or not there has been misconduct calling such a principle into operation, is a party
'vho is not before the court, namely, the enemy himself.
The neutral claimant can hardly have much information
about it, and certainly can not be expected to prove or
disprove it. His Majesty's Government, also 'vell
aware of the facts, has already, by the fact as 'vell as by
the recitals of the order in council, solemnly declared the
substance and effect of that kno,vledge, and an independent inquiry into the course of contemporary events,
both naval and military, is one 'vhich a court of prize is
but ill-qualified to undertake for itself. Still less 'vould
it be proper for such a court to inquire into the reasons of
Ju~tificationfor policy military or other 1vhich have been the cause and
retaliatory mens'
•
'
ures.
are to be the justification for resorting to retaliation for
that misconduct. Its function is, in protection of the
rights of neutrals, to weigh on a proper occasion the
n1easures of retaliation 'vhich have been adopted in fact,
and to inquire 'vhether they are in their nature or extent
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other than con1mensurate 'vith the prior 'vrong done,
and whether they inflict on neutrals, when they are looked
at as a whole, inconvenience greater than is reasonable
under all the circumstances. It follo\vs that a court
prize, while bound to ascertain, from the terms of the
order itself, the origin and the occasion of the relatiatory
measures for the purpose of weighing those measures with
justice as they affect neutrals, nevertheless ought not to
question, still less to dispute, that the warrant for passing
the order, vvhich is set out in its recitals, has in truth
arisen in the manner therein stated. Although the scope
of this inquiry is thus limited in la,v, in fact their lordships can not be blind to what is notorious to all the world
and is in the recollection of all men, the outrage, namely,
committed by the enemy, upon law, humanity, and the
rights, alike of belligerents and neutrals, \vhich led to,
and indeed compelled, the adoption of some such policy
as is embodied in this order in council. · In considering
'vhether n1ore inconvenience is inflicted upon neutrals
than the circumstances involve, the frequency and the
enormity of the original wrongs are alike material, for
the more gross and universal those \vrongs are, the more
are all nations concerned in their repression, and bound
for their part to submit to such sacrifices as that repression involves. It is right to recall that, as neutral commerce suffered and was doomed to suffer gross prejudice
from the illegal policy proclaimed and acted on by the
German Government, so it profited by, and obtained re. lief from, retaliatory measures, if effective to restrain, to
punish and to bring to an end such injurious conduct.
Neutrals, \vhose principles or policy lead them to refrain
from punitory or repressive action of their o\vn, n1ay \Veil
be called on to bear a passive part in the necessary suppression of courses \vhich are fatal to the freedom of all
\vho use the seas.
The argument principally urged at the bar ignored
these considerations, and assumed an absolute .right in
neutral trade to proceed \Vithout interference or restriction, unless by the application of the rules heretofore
e-stablished as to contraband traffic, unneutral service,
and blockade. The assumption \vas that a neutral, too
pacific or too impotent to resent the aggressions and la,vlessness of one belligerent, can require the other to refrain
fron1 his 1nost efl'ective, or his only, defense against it,
by the assertion of an absolute inviolability for his o\vn

of?
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neutral trade, \vhich \Vould thereby become engaged in a
passive co1nplicity \vith the original offender. ~For this
contention no authority at all was forthcorning. Refer. Orders in coun- ence was 1nade to the orders in council of 1806 to 1812
ell, 1806- 1812.
'
which were framed by \vay of retaliation for the Berlin
and lvlilan decrees. 'J:'here had been much discussion of
these celebrated instruments on one side or the other,
though singularly little in decided cases or in treatises of
repute; and, according to their nationality or their partisanship, \vriters have denounced the one policy or the
other, or have asserted their O\Vn superiority by an irnpartial censure of both. 'rhe present order, however, does
not involve for its justification a defense of the very
terms of those orders in council. It must be judged on
its merits and, if the principle is advanced against it
that such retaliation is \vrong in kind, no foundation in
authority has been found on which to rest it. Nor is the
principle itself sound. The seas are the highway of all,
and it is incidental to the very nature of n1aritime \Va.r
that neutrals, in using that highway, may suffer inconvenience from the exercise of their concurrent rights by
Blockade.
those who have to wage \Var upon it. Of this funda1nental
fact the right of blockade is only an exa1nple. It is true
that contraband, blockade, and unneutral service are
branches of international la\V which have their own history, their own illustrations, and their own development.
Their growth has been unsystematic, and the assertion of
right under these different heads has not been closely
connected or si1nultaneous. Nevertheless, it \vould be
illogical to regard the1n as being in themselves disconnected topics or as being the subject of rights and liabilities which have no comrnon connection. 'J:'hey n1ay
also be treated, as in fact they are, as illustrations of the
broad rule that belligerency and neutrality are states so
related to one another that the latter rnust accept some
abatement of the full benefits of peace in order that the
former 1nay not be thwarted in war in the assertion and
defense of what is the most precious of all the rights of
nations, the right to security and independence. The
categories of such cases are not closed. To deny to the
belligerent under the head of retaliation any right to
interfere 'vith the trade of neutrals beyond that \vhich,
quite apart from circurnstances which 'varrant retaliation,
he enjoys already under the heads of contraband, blockade, and unneutral service, \Yould be to take a\va.y \vith
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one hand ,,·hat has formally been conceded v.~ith the other.
As between belligerents acts of retaliation are either the
return of blow for blow in the course of combat, or are
questions of the laws of war not immediately falling under
the cognizance of a court of prize. Little of this subject
is left to prize law beyond its effect on neutrals and on the
rights of belligerents against neutrals, and to say that
retaliation is invalid as against neutrals, except within
the old limits of blockade, contraband, and unneutral
service, is to reduce retaliatipn to a mere simulacrum,
the title of an achnitted right without practical application
or effect.
Apart froin the Zamora, the decided cases on this subject, if not many, are at least not ambiguous. Of the
Leonora 16 , decided on the later order in council, their
lordships say nothing no,v, since they are informed that
it is under appeal to their lordships' board, and they
desire on the present occasion to say no more, which
might affect the determination of that case, than is indispensable to the disposal of the present one.
Sir William Scott's decisions on the retaliatory orders slOns.
.s cott's deciin council were many, and many of them 'v-ere affirmed
on appeal. He repeatedly, and in reasoned terms, declared the nature of the right of retaliation and its entire
consistency 'vith the principles of international law.
Since then discussion has turned on the measures by 'vhich
effect was then given to that right, not on the foundation of the principle itself, and their lordships regard
it as being no'v too firmly established to be open to
doubt.
Turning to the question which was little argued, if at ~xcessivehard. In
. t l1e case, 'vh eth er ship
on neutral
. IS
. t h e reaI question
a11, t h ough It
commerce.
the order in council of March 11, 1915, inflicts hardship
excessive either in kind or in degree upon neutral commerce, their lordships think that no such hardship 'vas
sho,vn. It might well be said that neutral coinmerce
under this order is treated 'vith all practicable tenderness, but it is enough to negative the contention that
there is avoidable hardship. Of the later order in council they say nothing no,v. If the neutral shipowner is
paid a proper price for the service rendered by his
ship, and the neutral cargo-o,vner a proper price according to the value of his goods, substantial cause of complaint can only arise if considerations are put fonvard
76
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'\vhich go beyond the ordinary motives of commerce and
partake of a political character, from a desire either to
embarrass the one belligerent or to support the other.
In the present case the agree1nent of the parties as to the
amount to be a1lo\ved for freight disposes of all question as to the claimants' rights to compensation for mere
inconvenience caused by enforcing the order in council.
Presumably that stun took into account the actual course
and duration of the voyage and constituted a proper
recompense alike for carrying and for discharging the
cargo under the actual circumstances of that service.
The further claims are in the nature of claims for damages for unla,vful interference with the performance of the
Rotterdam charter party. They can be maintained only
by supposing that a '\Vrong was done to the claimants,
because they were prevented from performing it, for in
their nature these claims assume that the shipowners
are to be put in the same position as if they had completed the voyage under that contract, and are not merely
to be remunerated on proper terms for the performance
of the voyage, which was in fact accomplished. In other
words, they are a claim for damages, as for wrong done
by the mere fact of putting in force the order in council.
Such a claim can not be sustained. Their lordships will
humbly advise IIis ~{ajesty that the appeal should be
dismissed ,~vi th costs.
THE

"I.~EONORA."

[PRIVY CouNCIL.]

ON APPEAL FR.Ol\1 TI-IE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND.
July 31, 1919.
[1919] A. C. 974.

Appeals from decrees of the admiralty division (in
prize) dated April 18, 1918. 77
The appellants in the two appeals \Vere respectively
the O'\vners of the Dutch stee:unship Leonora and the
o'\vners of a cargo of coal 'vhich she 'vas carrying when
captured. The ship and cargo 'vere seized and condemned under an order in council of February 16, 1917,
kno,vn as the second retaliatory order. The facts
appear from the judgment of their lordships. The order
77

[1918] p . 18!?.

